2nd Jun,17

Bipartisan Patent Reform and Competition Policy

2018-06-05T10:43:37+00:00By |

Published: May 4, 2017 Publication: American Enterprise Institute (Tim Muris is a Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, Senior Counsel at Sidley Austin LLP, and was chair of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission from 2001 to 2004. He published a report with the American [...]

1st Mar,17

Empirical study on patenting and standardization activities at IEEE

2017-05-23T03:42:11+00:00By |

Published: 3/1/17 Publication: IPlytics GmbH Technical standardization can involve the integration of hundreds, thousands or even tens of thousands of technologies, many of which are protected by patents. Such “standard essential patents” (SEPs) are subject to a variety of unique contract and competition law issues and considerations. To support access [...]

21st Nov,16

Standard-Essential Patents within Global Networks – An Emerging Economies Perspective

2017-05-22T19:17:53+00:00By |

Published: 11/21/16Publication: SSRNEfficient licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) is crucial for achieving a rapid and broad-based diffusion of innovation. Owners of large SEP portfolios (and their supporters) argue that the governance of SEPs works reasonably well and that patent holdup and other negative effects are “purely theoretical”. In reality however, [...]

1st Jan,14

The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones

2017-05-23T03:47:10+00:00By |

Published: 1/1/14 This article estimates the royalty stack for smartphones on the basis of publicly available information regarding licensing terms.  The article presents a “bottom-up” analysis of  smartphone royalties by examining the potential royalty burden on the major technologies and components in smartphones.   According to the article, “setting aside off-sets [...]

19th Dec,13

Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up

2017-05-22T19:17:56+00:00By |

Published: 12/19/13Publication: Antitrust Law JournalThis article discusses the problem of patent hold-up, which arises because the adoption of standards increase the value of patents once they are incorporated into standards.  Those “standard essential patents” must now be licensed based on their ex ante value, when alternative technologies could have been [...]

2nd Jul,13

Strategic Patent Acquisitions

2017-05-23T03:43:59+00:00By |

Published: 7/2/13 Publication: Antitrust Law Journal This economic paper, focused largely on patent assertion entities, also explains that even a risk-neutral licensee would be willing to pay more than three times the FRAND value of a SEP to avoid the smallest chance of losing in court. Read More

19th Oct,10

Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties

2017-05-22T19:17:58+00:00By |

Published: 10/19/10Publication: American Law and Economics ReviewCarl Shapiro, a leading competition economist and a former Chief Economist in the U.S. Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, applied an economic model which “shows that for weak patents covering a minor feature of a high-margin product that takes time to redesign, a large fraction [...]

10th Aug,06

Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking

2017-05-23T03:43:09+00:00By |

Published: 8/10/06 Publication: Texas Law Review This article used bargaining theory to show “that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of [...]

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