Case COMP/38.636 – Rambus
Published: 12/9/12
The Rambus case involved allegations of standard-setting deception rather than FRAND abuse. The European Commission’s decision in Rambus is nevertheless relevant to the FRAND debate because of its analysis of the appropriate royalty base on which a SEP holder may impose a royalty. In the Commission’s market testing of a set of proposed commitments offered by Rambus to license its SEPs on reasonable terms, some respondents expressed the concern that Rambus would seek to “extract royalties […]
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning “”Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents””
Published: 7/11/12
As part of its statement, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission noted that “a SEP owner [has] the ability to demand and obtain royalty payments much higher than might have been available prior to adoption of the standard because these rates need not be based on the true market value of its patents, but instead on the costs and delays of switching away from the standardized technology.”
Statement of Joseph F. Wayland Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Published: 7/11/12
In this testimony, the U.S. Justice Department’s Antitrust Division explains the potential for standardization to enable SEP holders to engage in patent hold-up, “such as by excluding a competitor from a market or obtaining an unjustifiably higher price for its invention than would have been possible before the standard was set.” The testimony explains that FRAND commitments are designed to prevent those problems and others impacting standard implementers and consumers. SEP holders benefit as well: “[A] […]
Third Party Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest
Published: 6/1/12
In its statement, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission urged the ITC to consider that “a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order may be weighted heavily in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the RAND commitment. High switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND commitment…because implementers are locked into practicing the standard.” […]
Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and The Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Researc
Published: 2/13/12
Summary is based on unofficial translations
This statement announced the closing of the acquisitions of two large patent portfolios in the telephony and networking industries. During the investigation, some firms expressed concerns about the anticompetitive use of SEPs that were included within the acquired portfolios. These concerns, were obviated, however, by the acquirers’ commitment during the course of the investigation to license the acquired SEPs on FRAND terms and “not to seek injunctions in […]
Case No COMP/M.6381 – Google/Motorola Mobility
Published: 2/13/12
The Commission reviewed Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holding (MMH), including its patent portfolio containing a number of SEPs, to determine the transaction’s compatibility with competition requirements. As to the acquisition of MMH’s SEPs, the European Commission explained that “FRAND commitments essentially oblige SEP owners: (i) to make the patent in question available to all interested third parties; (ii) not to discriminate between different licensees; and (iii) to offer a license to the patent on fair […]